Finding Silver Linings in the Storm: An Evaluation of Recent Canada-US Crossborder Developments by Arthur J. Cockfield
C.D. Howe Institute
COMMENTARY
Finding Silver Linings 
in the Storm:
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TAX COMPETITIVENESS PROGRAMRecently, a storm of activity has swirled around rules governing the tax treatment of
Canada–US crossborder investment. The high degree of integration of the
Canadian and US economies means that the effects of such tax changes can be
significant.
One new development involves revisions to the Canada–US tax treaty – including
the abolition of crossborder withholding tax rates for interest payments, the
provision of treaty benefits for members of limited liability companies, and the
development of mandatory arbitration processes for transfer pricing purposes –
which could signal a readiness on Ottawa’s part to make further efforts to ensure that
tax does not unduly inhibit entrepreneurial efforts to tie together the North
American economies.
Another important development: ongoing efforts by Ottawa to engage in corporate
income tax competition with the United States and to inhibit certain aggressive
crossborder tax-planning structures that enable Canadian taxpayers to obtain
valuable tax benefits when they fund foreign operations.
In a number of areas, however, undue restrictions on, or distortions of, crossborder
investment remain, which could harm Canada’s economic interests. Further reform
efforts should include: reviewing and targeting for elimination tax rules that unduly
discriminate against the interests of US investors; eliminating withholding taxes on
crossborder parent/subsidiary dividends; changing domestic group taxation laws,
with the ultimate goal of crossborder tax loss relief; and enhancing administrative
cooperation between the two countries’ tax authorities to reduce compliance costs
for firms with operations in both countries, including the development of a case-by-
case approval process for tax relief for crossborder mergers and acquisitions.
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I
n the past year, a veritable storm 
of activity has swirled around the
development of new rules to govern
the tax treatment of Canada-US
crossborder investment. 
These developments include revisions to the
Canada-US tax treaty, ongoing efforts to keep
Canadian corporate income tax rates lower than
their US counterparts, and federal government
budget proposals to inhibit certain crossborder 
tax-planning strategies.
Because the Canadian and US economies are
highly integrated – sharing, for instance, larger
trade flows than any two other economies in
history – tax developments that encourage or
inhibit crossborder investment can have a sig-
nificant effect (Cockfield 2005, 11-14). The
United States is by far the most important source
of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the Canadian economy.1 Indeed, such is the
importance of US investment in Canada that
Canadian international tax policy often “aims for
the moon, but lands in the United States” (Bird
1989, 433).
This Commentary evaluates recent Canada-US
crossborder tax developments. It concludes that the
storm of activity has a number of silver linings that
reduce tax as a barrier to crossborder investment,
and proposes tentative recommendations to further
brighten the sky and facilitate investment between
the two countries. 
The next section discusses recent efforts to revise
the Canada-US tax treaty, including the abolition
of crossborder withholding tax rates for interest
payments, the provision of treaty benefits for
members of limited liability companies, which are
business entities formed under laws of US states,
and the development of mandatory arbitration
processes for transfer pricing purposes. From an
international tax law policy perspective, these
efforts make sound policy sense and, in an envi-
ronment of increasing regional economic
integration, reduce tax barriers to US investment in
Canada while striving to ensure that Canada’s tax
regime remains competitive vis-à-vis its US coun-
terpart. In fact, these tax developments could signal
a readiness on the part of the federal government to
promote additional reform efforts to ensure that tax
does not unduly inhibit entrepreneurial ties in
North America.
The Commentary then discusses ongoing efforts
by the federal government to engage in corporate
income tax rate competition with the United States
as well as to draft tax laws to inhibit certain
aggressive crossborder tax-planning structures,
including so-called double-dip financing schemes,
which enable Canadian taxpayers to obtain
valuable tax benefits when they fund foreign
operations. The analysis supports the government’s
efforts to engage in tax competition but queries
whether there are more effective reforms, other
than restricting double dips, to deal with the
problem of excessive interest deductions for foreign
operations.
The final section of the paper sets out four
tentative international tax proposals that have
attracted academic and policy support over the
years to further reduce tax as a barrier to Canada-
US crossborder investment. While more research is
required to explore potential costs and benefits, the
federal government should consider taking steps to:
￿ reduce tax discrimination that favours domestic
investment over US investment;
￿ abolish withholding taxes for crossborder
parent/subsidiary dividends;
￿ amend group taxation laws and promote
crossborder tax relief; and
￿ enhance tax cooperation through mechanisms
such as a case-by-case tax approval process for
crossborder mergers and acquisitions.
Independent • Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
This paper is based on a presentation delivered at the C.D. Howe Institute conference on “Business Tax Reform in Canada: The Unfinished
Agenda”, Toronto, April 10, 2008. The author is grateful to the conference participants for their many helpful comments.
1 At the end of 2007, US investors accounted for 58 percent of total FDI holdings in Canada, down from 61 percent in 2006; in dollar amounts,
however, US direct investment holdings increased by $21.4 billion in 2006 to $288.6 billion in 2007 (Statistics Canada 2008). In contrast,
Canadian investors provide a much smaller percentage of overall FDI flows to the United States: roughly $17 billion of $109 billion in FDI to
the United States in 2007, approximately 16 percent of the inflows (United States 2007a). | 2 Commentary 272
These reforms could help to ensure that tax does
not prevent the Canadian economy from reaping
economic benefits through closer ties with the US
economy.
Evaluating Recent Tax Treaty Changes 
On September 21, 2007, Canada and the United
States signed the Fifth Protocol to revise their
bilateral tax treaty. Canada ratified the protocol on
December 14, 2007, but the United States has not
yet done so, and the protocol will not enter into
force until this ratification takes place.2 Before dis-
cussing the changes that will take place under the
tax treaty, it may be helpful to describe briefly the
role the treaty plays in setting the rules
that govern the tax treatment of
crossborder investment.
Currently, the tax treaty sets out
two different methods of taxing
crossborder investment, depending on
whether the investment generates
what is broadly construed as active
business profits or “passive” income
such as interest, dividends, or
royalties. With respect to the former category, the
treaty entitles each country to tax active business
profits arising from FDI if the foreign investor
maintains a “permanent establishment” in the other
country to which the profits can be attributed. For
example, if a US music retailer wished to expand
into the Canadian market, opened a store in
Toronto, and earned $1,000 in profits from sales to
local consumers, the store would constitute a
permanent establishment under the tax treaty,
entitling the Canadian federal government to tax all
business profits attributable to the store. If, however,
the US retailer merely sold music to Canadian
consumers, perhaps through a commercial website,
without opening a store, Canada would generally
not be permitted under the treaty to tax the profits
generated by music sales to Canadian consumers.3
For the passive category, when a payment of
crossborder interest is made to a nonresident
individual or firm, the tax treaty currently mandates
the imposition of a 10 percent gross withholding tax
on the payment, and the payer is required to remit
the withheld amount to the relevant tax authority,
either the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) or the
US Internal Revenue Service (IRS). For example, if
a Canadian parent company loans money to its US
subsidiary, which then makes an interest payment of
$100, the subsidiary is required to withhold $10
and remit that amount to the IRS, and the parent
corporation receives the remaining amount.4
As a broad generalization,
Canadian tax rules strive to tax
Canadian residents on their 
worldwide income – that is, their
income from both domestic and
foreign sources.5 However, the tax
laws of both Canada and the
United States, as well as provisions
of the tax treaty, are designed to
provide relief from international double taxation.
Since other countries might try to tax income
generated within their borders by Canadian
residents, Canada’s tax rules attempt to inhibit such
double taxation of the same income by providing a
foreign tax credit to offset the Canadian tax
otherwise payable on foreign-source income earned
by Canadian taxpayers. In the withholding tax
example, the Canadian resident taxpayer would
generally be permitted to use a $10 foreign tax
credit to offset Canadian taxes otherwise payable. In
the permanent establishment example, the United
States, which similarly grants foreign tax credits to
relieve double taxation, would provide a foreign tax
credit for Canadian taxes paid on the profits of the
Toronto-based store.
C.D. Howe Institute
2 On July 10, 2008, the protocol was introduced to a US Senate committee to begin the ratification process. While the protocol will generally enter into
force after congressional ratification, Article 27 sets forth a number of specific effective dates (some retroactive) for various provisions of the protocol.
3 Under certain narrow circumstances, if the US retailer sold digital music to Canadian consumers through a computer server in Canada, the
server might constitute a permanent establishment, which would then entitle Canada to tax profits attributable to the server (Cockfield 2001). 
4 Withholding taxes for certain crossborder payments date back to the original bilateral tax treaties that were modelled after League of Nations
efforts in the post-World War I environment (see League of Nations 1925).
5 A major exception to this rule is that Canadian tax laws effectively exempt from Canadian taxation any active business profits generated within a
foreign corporate affiliate that is based in a tax treaty partner or a country that has negotiated a tax information exchange agreement with Canada.
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6 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. 1, s. 212(1)(b).
The Abolition of Withholding Taxes 
on Interest Payments
The most important change in the Canada-US
tax treaty is the decision to abolish, over a
stipulated time, withholding taxes on crossborder
interest payments. For interest paid between non-
arm’s-length parties – for example, between a
parent corporation and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary – the new protocol proposes to reduce the
interest withholding tax from 10 percent to 7
percent in the first year, to 4 percent in the
second year, and to eliminate the withholding tax
completely in the third year after the protocol
enters into force. 
The protocol also proposes to abolish imme-
diately crossborder interest payments between
arm’s-length taxpayers – that is, taxpayers who
cannot effectively exert control over one another.
For example, a Canadian corporation that
invested in US government bonds would no
longer have to pay withholding tax on any
interest the US government paid on the bonds. In
addition to this treaty change, Canada amended
the federal Income Tax Act, effective January 1,
2008, to repeal the withholding tax on
crossborder interest payments between arm’s-
length parties.6
There are sound policy reasons to support these
developments, in part because withholding taxes
are sometimes portrayed as barriers to crossborder
investment. For instance, if a taxpayer cannot
receive a foreign tax credit for the withholding tax
payment, then double taxation could result.
Consider the example of a US firm that borrowed
money from a related Canadian company to fund
its crossborder investment. The Canadian firm
would pay, say, $100 in interest and, prior to the
treaty changes, would withhold and remit $10 to
the CRA. The related US firm would be entitled
to a foreign tax credit to offset the $10 it
effectively paid in Canadian taxes; at the same
time, this credit would reduce the tax owed by the
US firm to the US government. But the related US
company might not be eligible to use a foreign tax
credit for the $10 it paid in Canadian tax if it
declared a loss for the fiscal year (and hence did
not owe any US tax) or if its net income tax owed
to the US government on the payment was less
than the gross amount that was withheld. Financial
institutions often cannot obtain full foreign tax
credits for these withholding taxes because the
recipient of the interest might have a very narrow
spread on the income, so that the domestic tax is
less than the withholding tax. In such circum-
stances, double taxation can result that inhibits
crossborder investment activities. Moreover, the
withholding tax increases compliance costs for
both companies – in particular, the US firm has to
plan to avoid double taxation – which also dis-
courages such ventures. 
The abolition of the withholding tax does,
however, raise the policy concern that Canada, as
a net importer of capital from the United States,
will lose revenues associated with the imposition
of the withholding tax on crossborder interest
payments to US companies – the Department of
Finance estimates such revenues to have
amounted to $381 million in 2005 (Canada
2008, 39). 
Transfer-Pricing Issues
When multinational firms with related parties in
the two countries transfer goods, services, or
capital among the related parties, a transfer price is
set for such transactions. The transfer price
received or charged for goods, services, or
financing is included in the supplier’s income, and
the corresponding cost or payment is deducted
from the related party’s profits. The transfer price
is thus an important factor in allocating the profit
from the transaction to the parties. In recent years,
however, Canadian and US tax authorities
increasingly have disagreed on how to divvy up
taxable profits derived from businesses with
operations in both countries. The two countries
had negotiated a treaty provision on voluntary| 4 Commentary 272
arbitration of tax disputes in the Third Protocol, in
1995, but never implemented the provision,
although binding arbitration provisions exist in
both the Canada-Mexico tax treaty and the US-
Mexico tax treaty. Under the new protocol,
however, if the tax authorities cannot resolve a
dispute, the taxpayer will, under certain con-
ditions, be able to compel the authorities to refer
the dispute to a panel for binding arbitration. This
reform should help to resolve the issue of taxes
owed and relieve taxpayers of having to worry
about increasingly contentious tax disputes
dragging on for years.
Tax laws in the two countries, as well as the
tax treaty, require related companies to use the
market price (or arm’s-length price) when they
charge for crossborder transfers of goods and
services.7 This requirement helps to prevent
taxpayers from manipulating their profits so as to
avoid paying their “fair” share of taxes to both
countries. For example, because the two
countries maintain different tax regimes,
taxpayers engage in arbitrage strategies to gain
tax benefits. A fairly straightforward strategy
involves a company in one country increasing
the price of intercompany transfers of goods
shipped to a subsidiary in the country with the
heavier tax burden, thereby shifting accounting
profits to the lower-tax country – in effect, the
company’s profits are allocated for tax reasons.
This kind of strategy, however, wastes businesses
resources and diverts revenues away from the
treasury of the country where the value-adding
economic activity takes place.
Nevertheless, it is often difficult to determine
the appropriate arm’s-length price. For instance,
when related companies transfer unique assets
such as patents, there is no market transaction
between them that can be used to determine the
appropriate price. For this reason, taxpayers in
Canada and the United States often get
embroiled in disputes with their tax authorities,
which assert that they have not charged the
appropriate transfer prices for their crossborder
transactions. Turner (1996) suggests that,
because the IRS is perceived to have become
more aggressive in auditing transfer prices, tax
advisors might have compensated by recom-
mending shifting more profits to the United
States, resulting in fewer taxable profits in
Canada. Partly in response to this perception,
the CRA has audited the transfer pricing
practices of multinational firms more aggressively
in recent years, thus increasing compliance costs
in this area and leading to more disputes
between taxpayers and the Canadian tax
authorities (Smith and Kelly 2005). 
The danger of significant misallocation of
revenues is exacerbated, moreover, because
roughly two-thirds of the trade between Canada
and the United States takes place between related
firms (Rugman 1990, 36). In 2006, for example,
the two countries had roughly $626 billion in
trade (Statistics Canada 2007, chart 20:2). It is
likely that related-party transactions between the
two countries will increase as a result of global
business trends, including a reduction in com-
munications costs, which are encouraging higher
levels of integration of crossborder supply chains
and a more complex and sophisticated range of
economic activities (Dymond and Hart 2008).
As an important step forward on transfer-
pricing issues, Canada and the United States
have agreed to use transfer-pricing guidelines
established by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) to
determine the appropriate market price to be
charged between related parties. A common
understanding of the rules and principles, along
with mechanisms to force agreement according
to the underlying facts and circumstances,
should help to promote the effective resolution
of transfer-pricing disputes between the two
countries. In a related move, the CRA has
expanded and streamlined its advanced pricing
agreement (APA) program, under which
taxpayers, the CRA, and foreign tax authorities
agree on the methodology to calculate transfer
C.D. Howe Institute
7 See s. 247 of Canada’s Income Tax Act, reg. s. 1.482 of the US Internal Revenue Code, and Article IX of the Canada-US tax treaty.Commentary 272 | 5
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prices.8 One such method is to use the com-
parable uncontrolled price, whereby taxpayers
establish an arm’s-length price by referring to
sales or purchases of similar products and trans-
actions between unrelated parties. Despite 
this progress, however, there has been little
improvement in the time it takes to finalize 
an APA, in part because of delays caused by
dealings with the US tax authorities
(Skretkowicz and Diebel 2006). Finally, in
2004, the Canadian and US tax authorities
signed an agreement to adopt consistent transfer
price documentation requirements through the
Pacific Association of Tax Administrators
(PATA), which could help to reduce compliance
costs for firms with related-party operations in
both countries (Canada 2004b). Extending
PATA membership to the Mexican tax
authorities would promote a more harmonious
tax environment for the North American mar-
ketplace by allowing firms to follow one clear 
set of rules.
Notwithstanding this progress on transfer
pricing, at least two areas of concern remain.
First, Canada, unlike the United States, has
decided to proceed with administrative pro-
nouncements instead of enacting tax laws (see
Canada 1999). Since these pronouncements are
persuasive to courts, at best, a fair amount of
uncertainty remains with respect to, for
instance, the appropriate transfer-pricing
methodology. Such tax uncertainty does not
help to promote crossborder investment activity.
The federal government could help to clear up
this problem by legislating aspects of its
information circular or at least by making
reference to the OECD transfer-pricing
guidelines in s. 247 of the Income Tax Act.9
Second, in an environment of heightened
auditing, enhanced documentation
requirements, and the need for more sophis-
ticated tax advice (often by economists and
other experts) to discern and protect an
appropriate transfer-pricing methodology, com-
pliance costs for Canadian firms inevitably are
rising, which could inhibit crossborder
investment. As discussed in more detail in the
next section, the Canadian tax authorities
should consider additional cooperative efforts
with their US counterparts – for example, to
reduce or eliminate some of the documentation
requirements for highly integrated North
American firms, while ensuring that enhanced
audit cooperation lowers the risk that reduced
reporting requirements will lead to abusive tax
planning that erodes the Canadian tax base. 
The Extension of Treaty Benefits 
to Owners of US LLCs
The Canada-US tax treaty has also been
amended, under Article IV(6), to extend treaty
benefits to owners of business entities called
limited liability companies (LLCs), formed
under the laws of US states and often used for
crossborder investment purposes, and to deny
treaty benefits for certain aggressive tax-planning
structures. The first reform should facilitate US
investment in Canada, but the second could
inhibit some inward investment. At the end of
the day, it remains unclear whether the net effect
will be to increase or reduce tax as a barrier to
crossborder investment between the two
countries.
By way of background, under the current tax
treaty, benefits are extended only to residents of
8 A recent study has found that 80  percent of APAs are negotiated among taxpayers and the Canadian and US tax authorities (Canada
2006/2007). The remaining 20 percent involve agreements with six other countries, principally Japan, the United Kingdom, and
Australia.
9 In the past, Canadian courts have looked to OECD materials when interpreting provisions of Canadian tax treaties, and they may well refer to
the OECD transfer-pricing guidelines, which the CRA has endorsed, to encourage consistency with the application of transfer-pricing rules
used in other jurisdictions. For a discussion of the relationship between Canadian transfer-pricing rules and those of the OECD, see
SmithKline Beecham Animal Health Inc. v Canada, [2002] 4 CTC 93 (FCA). An explicit reference within s. 247 of the Income Tax Act to
adhere to the OECD guidelines would be the preferred route to promoting tax certainty.| 6 Commentary 272
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10 The CRA’s view has been that, unless it elects to be treated as a corporation for US federal income tax purposes, an LLC cannot be considered
as resident under Article IV(1) of the treaty since it is not a person liable to tax in the United States at the entity level. See, for example, CRA
doc. no. 2004-0064761R3 2004.
11 The US Internal Revenue Code prescribes the classification of various organizations for federal tax purposes, including which entities,
domestic and foreign, are to be regarded as corporations per se (see I.R.C. Regs. § 301.7701-1). Generally, under the default classification rules,
a domestically eligible entity is a partnership if it has two or more members and disregarded as an entity separate from its owner if it has a
single owner (I.R.C. Regs. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)).
12 Under US “check-the-box” regulations, the default classification for LLCs and the similar Canadian business entities is to be treated as a flow-
through entity.
13 Article IV(7) of the revised tax treaty contains two highly technical rules. Under the first rule (paragraph (a)), treaty benefits may be limited
where, for example, income from Canadian sources is derived by a US resident through a Canadian partnership that is treated as a fiscally
transparent entity for Canadian tax purposes and as a nonresident corporation for US tax purposes. Under the second rule (paragraph (b)),
treaty benefits may be limited where, for example, income from Canadian sources is derived by a US resident through a Canadian unlimited
liability company that is treated as a corporation for Canadian tax purposes and as a fiscally transparent entity for US tax purposes. The new
article will take effect on the first day of the third calendar year that ends after the Fifth Protocol enters into force.
each country, and the CRA has taken the position
that LLCs and their owners do not qualify.10The
reluctance to extend benefits to LLCs stems in part
from the fact that Canadian federal and provincial
business laws generally do not permit the formation
of similar entities. Although LLCs have been around
for several decades, their usage exploded in many
states in the 1990s, and they are a familiar entity for
US investors. An LLC resembles a Canadian cor-
poration in that it generally provides immunity to its
owners, who are referred to as “members,” not share-
holders, and corporate profits are taxed once at the
corporate level and again at the shareholder level
when the profits are distributed by way of dividends.
Under the US tax regime, however, LLCs can be
treated as fiscally transparent entities,11 similar to
Canadian partnerships, so that profits and losses
“flow through” the entities – that is, the entities
themselves are not taxed – and are taxed only once in
the hands of the members. This tax treatment is par-
ticularly important for investors who foresee initial
losses when a new venture is started, as they can often
use these losses to offset gains from other sources of
income. Since, under US tax laws, corporate taxpayers
are generally permitted to engage in loss offsetting,
US investors, all else being equal, would prefer to make
domestic investments if they envision start-up losses. 
In Canada, the two types of business entity that
most closely resemble a US LLC are the Nova Scotia
unlimited liability company – which has been around
even longer than LLCs, though less frequently used
for business purposes outside of tax planning – and
the Alberta unlimited liability company, introduced
in 2006. Like LLCs, these two entities are often used
for tax-planning purposes by US investors to 
consolidate losses and to maximize their US foreign
tax credits.12
The extension of treaty benefits to members of
LLCs means that Canada will treat LLCs (and similar
business entities) as corporations with Canadian
source income, and any distribution of income to
members will be subject to the reduced withholding
tax rates set out in the new protocol. To illustrate, if a
US resident were to receive income, profit, or gain,
through a fiscally transparent US LLC, from
Canadian sources that was then taxed as though it
were earned directly by the US resident, that amount
would be treated under the revised treaty as though it
had been derived directly from US sources.
As the current treaty does not allow Canadian and
US taxpayers to engage in crossborder loss offsetting,
the new provision should facilitate inward investment
by US investors by permitting them to reap tax
benefits from losses that were previously trapped
within their Canadian investments. On the other
hand, in a more under-the-radar development, the
Canadian Department of Finance has introduced
complex new rules to restrict the use of certain hybrid
business entities, which, like LLCs, are businesses that
are treated as taxable entities in one country and as
fiscally transparent entities in the other.13These
entities, sometimes referred to as “reverse hybrids,”
are used in the Canada-US context to promote tax-
efficient crossborder financings and holding
structures.
In another important reform, Canada has agreed to
try to inhibit “treaty shopping,” which occurs when
an investor outside Canada or the United StatesCommentary 272 | 7
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engages in tax planning to gain access to the benefits
of the Canada-US treaty. This represents a policy
change from earlier negotiations with the United
States, since the federal government traditionally had
taken the view that, in order to attract more invest-
ment to Canada, treaty benefits should be provided
to investors based outside the United States and had
agreed in 1984 only to prevent foreign investors from
using the treaty to gain access to the US market.
The elimination of certain hybrid business entities
for planning purposes and the new reciprocal limi-
tations-on-benefits article will have a countervailing
effect, however, on the move to extend treaty benefits
to members of LLCs. Thus, North American tax
advisors will need to review carefully existing and
planned crossborder tax planning structures to ensure
they comply with the treaty changes. At the end of
the day, it is not clear that US or Canadian investors
will be in a better or worse tax position to take
advantage of potential start-up losses from their
crossborder investments.
In summary, most of the tax treaty initiatives
appear to support Canadian economic interests and
represent real progress in eliminating tax as a barrier
to Canada-US crossborder investment. Moreover, this
progress could signal readiness on the part of the
federal government to tackle other tax policy
challenges.
Assessing Ongoing Reform Efforts 
Two ongoing reform efforts by the Canadian federal
government have particular significance for
crossborder investment: steps to maintain Canada’s
tax competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States, and
draft legislation to eliminate double-dip financing of
crossborder investments with related firms in the
United States and elsewhere.
Protecting Canada’s Tax Competitiveness through
Corporate Tax Rate Competition 
An interesting feature of Canada’s international tax
policy in recent years has been Ottawa’s effort to
engage in explicit corporate income tax rate com-
petition with the United States (as well as with other
trade partners). For instance, under the previous
Liberal government, the Department of Finance
began to publish pronouncements that touted the
“Canadian tax advantage” by drawing comparisons
between Canadian corporate income tax rates and
their US counterparts (while generally ignoring the
rates in other countries). A 2002 document set out a
number of such comparisons, and forecast that the
average federal corporate tax rate in Canada would be
more than six percentage points lower than its US
counterpart by 2008 (Canada 2002). The current
government appears to be engaging in a similar
strategy by, for example, drawing attention to its
announcement to reduce federal corporate income
tax rates from 19.5 percent in 2008 to 15 percent by
2012, and showing how these rates compare
favourably to US rates. After announcing the cut in
the House of Commons on October 30, 2007,
Finance Minister Jim Flaherty noted, “This will give
businesses in Canada a substantial tax advantage over
competitors in the United States – to be precise, a
statutory tax rate advantage of 12.3 percentage points
and an overall tax advantage on new business
investment of 9.1 percentage points in 2012”
(Flaherty 2007).
EXAMINING THE MERITS OF TAX COMPETITION:
Is tax rate competition a good idea from a policy
perspective? There is a significant body of 
literature that examines the merits of tax com-
petition, although the bulk of these writings
focuses on theoretical considerations and 
subnational tax issues (see, for example, Wilson
and Wildasin 2003; McKenzie 2006). A lack of
empirical work in the international tax arena 
and uncertainty about the ways taxpayers react 
to tax changes with respect to crossborder invest-
ment thus creates problems for legal analysis 
(see, for example, Cockfield 2007).
Recognizing these limits, concerns nevertheless
remain that tax competition can lead to a so-called
race to the bottom as countries compete by con-
tinually lowering rates to the point where they are
unable to fund needed government services. In a
related point, countries that engage in tax com-
petition might feel the need to focus taxation on
less mobile factors of production, such as workers,
while providing relief to more mobile factors, such| 8 Commentary 272
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14 Analysis of income tax data on taxpayers who left Canada for foreign countries during the 1990s shows that individuals who earned more than
$150,000 a year were seven times as likely to leave than the average taxpayer (Statistics Canada 2000).
as capital; the end result, according to some circles,
could be an increasingly regressive tax system with
a heavier tax burden on labour and a relatively
lighter burden on investments (and, hence, on
taxpayers who own these investments). Moreover,
in an environment of increased economic inte-
gration, it is more difficult to restore progressivity
to the income tax system by raising taxes on high-
income workers who may move to a country with
a relatively lighter tax burden.14
Will tax competition in the Canada-US context
lead to a race to the bottom? When one takes into
consideration the economic and political needs of
each country, it seems unlikely that
this will take place (Cockfield 2005,
164-74). Both countries wish to
enhance their ability to attract inward
investment, but both also prefer to
preserve as much political control as
possible over their tax systems
because they use these systems to
promote different economic and
social policy goals. Canada, as the smaller
economic unit, closely follows US tax policy devel-
opments in certain cases to ensure that they do not
harm its ability to attract and maintain US
investment. Accordingly, for the federal gov-
ernment, economic concerns trump political
concerns, and in matching US moves, it often
foregoes its sovereign right to pursue distinct tax
policy. Because the United States draws a much
smaller amount of inward investment from
Canada, it does not need to engage in tax com-
petition with Canada. It is either indifferent or
unwilling to sacrifice tax sovereignty to follow the
lead of a foreign country. It also bears mentioning
that, according to one view, relatively smaller
economies can benefit to a greater extent from tax
competition as investors in these countries are
more sensitive to tax differences than are investors
in larger economies (Wilson and Wildasin 2003).
For these reasons, Ottawa’s strategy to engage in
limited corporate income tax rate competition is
both rational and likely to promote economic
benefits to the Canadian economy. 
A potential drawback of this strategy – at least,
to the extent that it promotes actual differential tax
burdens – is that it might encourage tax distortion
as US investors seek out Canadian investments for
tax reasons, rather than for real economic reasons,
which could inhibit capital productivity in both
countries. In other words, giving a break to US
investors would raise the after-tax returns on their
crossborder investments, which might induce
inward investment into Canada even if, in the
absence of taxes, it would have been more efficient
for these US investors to invest at home. This
might distort crossborder investment decisions to
allocate these investments in a
manner that is not economically
efficient (see Committee of
Independent Experts on Company
Taxation 1992, chap. 10). Reduced
efficiencies, in turn, might lead to a
reduction of the overall economic
welfare or living standards that the
citizens of the two countries might
otherwise enjoy.
Another worry is that lowering tax rates could
diminish corporate tax revenues. In fact, despite
ongoing rate reductions, these revenues have been
on the rise in recent years, in part because of the
taxation of robust corporate profits from the
resources sector (Canada 2007). This outcome
might be a short-term result, however, which could
change depending on a weakening of demand for
natural resources or other factors.
RELATIVETAX BURDENS ON CAPITAL: In any event,
it is also important to note that, government hype
notwithstanding, Canada continues to impose a
higher tax burden on investment than does the
United States under many circumstances.
Corporate tax rates, in any case, determine only a
portion of this burden, as other aspects of the tax
system – such the ability of taxpayers to write off
equipment depreciation – as well as nontax factors
– such as interest and inflation rates – also con-
tribute to the ultimate tax burden on crossborder
investment. Moreover, taxes on individual
The US does not 
need to engage in tax
competition with
Canada ...Commentary 272 | 9
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investors, in addition to corporate taxes, ultimately
must be taken into consideration when scru-
tinizing overall tax burdens on crossborder capital.
Studies of the marginal effective tax rate
(METR) strive to take these factors into account;
the results reflect a rough estimate of the tax
burden investors face for each additional dollar of
crossborder investment (see, for example, Boadway
1985). Once these METRs are generated, they can
be compared with the METRs investors face in
other countries to see whether a particular national
tax system imposes a relatively higher or lower tax
burden. One such study (United States 2007b),
which takes into account both corporate and
individual income tax regimes, suggests that, in
many Canadian sectors, investments face a higher
overall tax burden than they do in the United
States – indeed, in 2006, Canada had the second-
highest METR (after Germany) of the G7
countries (ibid., 40). Importantly, taxes imposed
on corporations and individuals by the provinces
are significant contributors to Canada’s higher
METR. Another recent study shows, however, that
when one takes into account only taxes paid by
corporations, the tax burden on capital is, on
average, lower in Canada (Mintz 2007, 9). While
METRs try to measure the effect of tax on
marginal investment decisions, average corporate
tax rates can also be helpful in assessing the overall
portion of economic activity taken up by corporate
taxes; by this criterion, average corporate tax as a
percentage of gross domestic product over the
2000-05 period was 3.8 percent for Canada and
2.2 percent for the United States (United States
2007b, 42-43).15
THE END OF CORPORATE INCOMETAX RATE
REDUCTIONS? Not all studies just referred to take
into account the recent round of rate reductions
and other efforts by the federal government to
reduce the tax burden on individuals and
businesses. Nonetheless, to the extent that tax
competition brings overall benefits to the
Canadian economy, it might be necessary to
amend other aspects of Canada’s tax regime
besides rates, to reduce the tax burden on
marginal investment below its US counterpart.
Such a move, however, would run up against 
theoretical objections by tax policy analysts who
generally support the view that low tax rates and
a broad tax base are necessary to promote tax 
efficiencies and corresponding long-term
economic growth (see, for example, Canada
1966; Committee of Independent Experts on
Company Taxation 1992).
Importantly, Canada and the United States
have agreed to curtail certain harmful forms 
of tax base (but not tax rate) competition for
crossborder financial and other services through
the OECD’s harmful tax competition project.
Canada, for example, has dismantled “pref-
erential tax regime” provisions – that is, tax
provisions surrounding nonresident-owned
investment companies, international banking
centres, and international shipping – that were
identified in earlier OECD reports (OECD
1998, 2000). And, in its 2008 budget, 
Ottawa supported tax breaks to encourage 
more research and development and manu-
facturing activities. These reforms suggest that
the Canadian federal government is pursuing
heightened tax base competition by giving
special breaks to certain sectors to enable 
them to compete more effectively in the inter-
national arena.
Protecting the Income Tax Base by Eliminating
Double-Dip Financing
Another recent policy initiative by the federal gov-
ernment is its effort to inhibit aggressive
crossborder financing structures that were
perceived to reduce Canadian tax revenues unduly.
While this reform was motivated by compelling
policy reasons, there might be more effective tax
initiatives with which to attack the apparent
15 The study, conducted by the US Treasury Department, explains the United States’ relatively high METR and relatively low average tax rate by
noting that the United States has a relatively narrow tax base that permits more depreciation, more corporate tax preferences, and a relatively
high corporate income tax rate that incentivizes tax planning, which further reduces overall revenues.| 10 Commentary 272
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problem of excessive interest deductions to fund
foreign operations.
COMPELLING POLICY REASONSTO INHIBIT
AGGRESSIVE CROSSBORDER FINANCING: In its
2007 budget, Ottawa initially proposed to deny
interest deductions for any interest expenses that
could be traced to earnings-exempt foreign-source
income. In its original proposal, the Department
of Finance (Canada 2007, 241-42) noted that this
reform had been discussed earlier by the Technical
Committee on Business Taxation (Canada 1997)
and by the auditor general of Canada. The main
opposition to this reform came from those who
felt this step would make Canadian companies less
competitive than their foreign counterparts, since
eliminating tax-favoured foreign financing would
raise the cost of capital for crossborder ventures
(Brown and Poschmann 2007). In May 2007,
Ottawa amended the earlier proposal to target only
interest expenses attributable to more aggressive or
“double-dip” and other “tax-efficient” financing
structures. This proposal, which provides for a
transition period to 2012, was set out in draft leg-
islation by the Department of Finance on October
2, 2007, and enacted as new section 18.2 of the
Income Tax Act on December 14, 2007. 
Double-dip financing structures arise from the
peculiarities of Canadian tax laws and the ways
these laws interact with the tax laws of foreign
countries. By way of background, in the normal
course of events, a business deducts its interest
expenses as a cost of doing business, and the
interest is included and taxed in the hands of the
creditor – for example, if a Canadian bank receives
$100 in interest income, it will be taxed on this
income. Because of Canadian tax laws, however,
interest on loans through the financing of affiliates
located in low or nil tax jurisdictions often are not
subject to tax. A related party in Barbados, for
instance, can loan money to a related Canadian
company, but the interest income is subject to the
lower tax of Barbados, which is also a tax treaty
partner of Canada’s. Moreover, the Canadian
company can generally repatriate the interest
income from its financing affiliate in Barbados on
a tax-exempt basis.16 This is sometimes referred to
as a “single dip,” as the Canadian debtor cor-
poration deducts the interest and lowers its tax
bill while the corresponding income inclusion in
the foreign affiliate is free of tax (assuming the
affiliate is located in country without a corporate
income tax).
A double dip occurs when the foreign financing
affiliate lends money to a related operating
company typically based in a relatively high-tax
country, such as the United States.17 The
operating company pays interest to the financing
affiliate and is entitled to deduct the interest
payment to reduce its taxable income in the high-
tax country. If properly structured, the interest
payment will remain untaxed by the financing
affiliate’s country and, again, the money can be
repatriated to Canada free of Canadian tax.
Double-dip financing structures hence permit two
interest deductions in two countries for, effectively,
one loan transaction.
For a number of reasons, the double dip can be
portrayed as offending international tax law and
accounting policy principles. As a starting point,
there is a general accounting and tax law principle
called the matching principle, which maintains
that businesses should be entitled to a business
expense deduction if this expense can be matched
with the production of income for the business.18
The single and double dip, however, sidestep the
matching principle, since an item of income
escapes taxation while providing a tax benefit to
the Canadian corporation, which also erodes the
Canadian tax base. By dodging the matching
16 This result is achieved through the “exempt surplus” rules in s. 95 of the Income Tax Act, which permit the tax-exempt repatriation of profits
from active business income generated within a tax treaty partner country. Section 95(2) permits the interest income to be recharacterized as
active business income, so that it can generally be distributed on a tax-exempt basis to the Canadian affiliate. Recent tax law changes extend
the exemption system to foreign affiliates based in countries that have negotiated a tax information exchange agreement with Canada.
17 A second dip can also take place in Canada, for example, as part of a structure to guard against foreign-exchange risk.
18 Accounting principles, including the matching principle, must be used as a guide for the calculation of business profits for tax law purposes
unless there is an express provision in the Income Tax Act that indicates otherwise. See Canderel Ltd. v. R. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 147 (S.C.C.).Commentary 272 | 11
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principle, the double dip also violates the tax
policy goal of horizontal equity, which calls for the
same tax treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.
A domestic business is entitled to deduct interest
expenses to fund its income-producing activities.
Yet a Canadian firm that is expanding its business
internationally can take advantage of double-dip
financing, which effectively lowers the cost of debt
capital for foreign operations – that is, the tax
benefits make  it less expensive to borrow money
to finance foreign projects. As a result, tax laws
that permit double dips generally impose different
tax treatment on domestic firms and firms with
international operations.
A policy concern exists that this differential
treatment could demoralize taxpayers who are not
eligible for the double dip (or the single dip, for
that matter). A reasonable Canadian taxpayer – 
let us call her “the woman on the Ajax GO train,”
a term that can stand in for the reasonable 
English taxpayer referred to by English and
Canadian tax court judges as “the man on the
Clapham omnibus”19 – might be puzzled indeed
by the creative tax planning that appears to 
favour firms with resources that enable double
interest deductions on the same item of income. 
If the woman on the Ajax GO train owns a
business, she might additionally be upset that 
her own local business cannot access debt capital
on a similarly tax-favoured basis. The notion that
the financing activities of domestic and inter-
national firms should be taxed in a similar manner
induces tax compliance among residents because
they perceive the tax system to treat similarly
situated taxpayers in a similar manner (Shay,
Fleming, and Peroni 2002).
In a related point, the favouring of crossborder
financing also violates the international tax policy
principle of capital export neutrality, which
maintains that the tax system should not provide
tax incentives to invest abroad. As discussed pre-
viously, when tax artificially reduces the costs of
certain crossborder transactions, this might induce
taxpayers to engage in unproductive activities 
for tax reasons, not for real economic rationales.
In this case, double-dip financing structures could
act as an incentive for Canadians to invest abroad,
distorting investment decisionmaking in an
unproductive manner.
PROBLEMS WITHTHE DOUBLE-DIP PROPOSAL:
Nevertheless, complicating factors urge caution in
the implementation of the legislation to restrict
double-dip financing. Once single dips become
acceptable on the basis of promoting Canadian tax
competitiveness (as Ottawa apparently now
accepts), it is not clear that eliminating the double
dip would promote Canadian economic interests.
One problem is that the second dip normally takes
place in a third country where business operations
are based, not in Canada, hence the deduction
reduces taxable profits and revenues for foreign
governments, but not necessarily for the federal
government. As discussed in the example above,
the second interest deduction generally takes place
when a related business based in a high-tax
country such as the United States makes an
interest payment to a related financing affiliate
based in a tax haven. Because the double dip 
does not unduly erode the Canadian income tax
base, it is not clear how the attack on double-dip
financing fits with Ottawa’s larger strategy to
combat the abusive use of tax treaties.
Because Canadian firms apparently have used
the double dip for at least several decades, they
assert that this financing structure has helped them
to compete with foreign competitors by reducing
the cost of raising debt capital (Brean 1984, 120).
If this claim is true, the elimination of this method
for financing arguably could harm the interests of
Canadian firms while saving revenues only for
foreign governments. As mentioned, METR
studies generally estimate that the tax burden on
investment in many sectors is higher in Canada
than in the United States, but these studies do not
account for sophisticated crossborder tax planning
that ultimately determines the tax bill that firms
with operations in both countries pay. According
to one view, many US international tax rules –
including the check-the-box regime that allows US
19 See, for example, Justice Bowman, in Klotz v The Queen, [2004] 2 CT.C. 2892 (T.C.C.), affirmed [2005] D.T.C. (F.C.A.).| 12 Commentary 272
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taxpayers to elect how their business entities will
be treated for crossborder tax-planning purposes –
appear to encourage international tax arbitrage
that reduces tax revenues in relatively high-tax
countries such as Canada (Rosenbloom 1998). It is
thus difficult to say whether tax-planning activities
make Canadian firms more or less tax competitive
with respect to their US counterparts, which
deploy their own aggressive tax-planning
structures.20
It is also important to note that technical
problems associated with Ottawa’s legislation
might inhibit broader crossborder financing
schemes than double dips or the other targeted
tax-efficient structures; if this is the case, the
proposed changes would further restrict the ability
of Canadian firms to plan for tax efficiencies in the
Canada-US context and place these firms at a
greater tax disadvantage (Slaats 2007, 688). This
uncertainty also suggests that Ottawa should
proceed with caution, as we simply do not know
whether this reform will have a material effect on
crossborder investment decisions by US investors. 
Moreover, if the US or any other foreign gov-
ernment deems the revenue loss to be
unacceptable, it can take unilateral steps to restrict
double dip and other financing strategies involving
Canadian resident corporations, as the US gov-
ernment has done in the past to restrict perceived
overly aggressive tax-planning strategies by US
investors with investments in Canada (Kane
2004).21 As previously discussed, the Fifth
Protocol would amend the Canada-US tax treaty
to inhibit the use of certain tax-efficient structures
for planning purposes – for example, structures
that deploy reverse hybrid entities. In fact, new
Article IV(7)(b) of the treaty appears to be
designed to restrict the use of double-dip financing
structures, which raises the question of whether
the Canadian government’s additional unilateral
measures to restrict double-dip financing and
similar strategies are even necessary, at least in the
Canada-US context. If US tax laws facilitate tax
planning that takes advantage of different
Canadian and US laws to reduce global tax lia-
bilities, including a reduction in Canadian tax
revenues, it is unclear why the Canadian tax
authorities would cooperate with their US coun-
terparts to restrict certain forms of tax planning
that unduly reduce US tax revenues. 
Finally, the draft legislation requires the tracing
of Canadian interest payments to the financing of
foreign-source income. The tracing concept
requires segregating funds borrowed for financing
foreign operations from other funds. This
approach is notoriously difficult to enforce,
however, in part because the Supreme Court of
Canada has accepted certain tax-planning
structures that appear to circumvent the
requirement.22 In addition, to avoid the leg-
islation, Canadian firms might engage in tax
planning to move their financing activities out of
Canada or substitute the debt for other tax-
preferred financing, even if it is less economically
efficient to do so.23 Accordingly, the new tax laws
might not achieve their goal of restricting excessive
interest deductions to fund foreign operations. 
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS: Another perspective
maintains that there are more efficient routes to
attack the apparent problem of excess interest
deductions for foreign operations. Several com-
mentators who have scrutinized this issue carefully
maintain that an Australian-type “thin capital-
ization” rule may be more effective at combating
this problem than the approach currently
20 In 2000, the US Treasury and IRS issued final regulations to clarify the rules that permit treaty benefits for crossborder income paid to certain
hybrid entities. See I.R.C. Regs. § 1.894-1(d), which describes the eligibility rules for reduced treaty rates for income derived by an entity that
is fiscally transparent. Articles IV(6) and IV(7)(a) of the revised Canada-US tax treaty, which attack the use of certain reverse hybrid entities for
planning purposes, appear to follow the approach set out in these US final regulations.
21 For example, the United States has passed tax laws denying treaty benefits and recharacterizing deductible interest payments as nondeductible
dividend payments for certain transactions involving, inter alia, Canadian resident corporations.
22 See, for example, Ludco Enterprises Ltd. v Canada, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1082 (S.C.C.), which held that interest deductions were permissible within
an international tax planning structure that provided significant tax benefits.
23 Studies (for example, Altshuler and Newlon 1993) show that multinational firms can substitute different financing and repatriation strategies
to reduce global tax liabilities, and that these substitutions are largely unconstrained by nontax factors.Commentary 272 | 13
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advocated by the federal government (see, for
example, Mintz and Lanthier 2007; Edgar 2008).
Thin capitalization rules are tax laws that strive to
prevent excessive interest deductions in related
companies based in different countries. Under the
Australian approach, the thin capitalization regime
applies, with modifications, to both outbound and
inbound FDI. In contrast, Canada’s thin capital-
ization rules apply only in the context of inbound
financing, so that, if a loan is made from a related
party based outside Canada to its Canadian
corporate affiliate, the affiliate is permitted to
deduct only those interest payments associated
with interest on debt that exceeds the specified 2:1
debt-to-equity ratio (see Li, Cockfield, and Wilkie
2006, 121-26). In other words, if the Canadian
corporate affiliate is too “thinly capitalized” with
equity – that is, if its debt-to-equity ratio exceeds
2:1 – the rules will deny the deduction of a
portion of its interest payment to the foreign
related company.
Of interest, Australia previously attempted to
inhibit abusive interest deductions for foreign
operations through tax laws that tried to trace local
interest deductions to the earning of tax-exempt
income in foreign countries, in a way similar to
Ottawa’s new legislation’s attempt to attack double
dips. Australia abandoned this approach, however,
in favour of reforming its thin capitalization laws,
which was thought to be a more effective way to
attack the problem (Australia 2001).
It also bears mentioning that many European
countries are also redesigning their thin capital-
ization rules so as to offer roughly equal treatment
to inbound and outbound financing as a result of a
decision by the European Court of Justice.24 If the
new tax laws prove to be difficult or impossible to
enforce, the Canadian government should consider
similar reform efforts to amend Canadian thin
capitalization rules, which ultimately could prove
more effective at attacking the policy problem of
excessive interest deductions to fund foreign
operations.
Finding Our Way through the Storm:
Reducing Tax as a Barrier 
to Crossborder Investment
As we have seen, a number of recent tax devel-
opments should generally reduce tax as a barrier to
Canada-US crossborder investment. This section
briefly considers further tentative proposals in this
direction, although a fuller exploration of the 
costs and benefits associated with each proposal
would be required before one could make more
concrete recommendations. Nevertheless, the
federal government should consider further
reducing discriminatory tax treatment that favours
Canadian investors over US investors, eliminating
withholding taxes on crossborder parent/subsidiary
dividends, promoting crossborder tax relief, and
enhancing cooperation between tax authorities 
to reduce compliance costs for multinational firms
with operations in the two countries. 
Reduce Canadian Tax Discrimination
In certain cases, Canada continues to pursue dis-
criminatory tax policies that favour Canadian tax
interests over those of US and foreign investors.
Such discrimination inhibits inward investment
from the United States and encourages unac-
ceptable tax distortions that, in the long run, are
contrary to Canada’s economic interests.
Earlier comparative analysis has shown that dis-
crimination against nonresidents is significantly
greater in the Canadian tax system than in those of
the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia,
or New Zealand (Arnold 1991). A concern in the
Canada-US context is the fact that Canada has
agreed to extend national – that is, nondiscrim-
inatory – treatment under the US-Canada tax
treaty only to permanent establishments of US
residents in some circumstances, whereas the
United States extends national treatment to US
corporations owned or controlled by Canadians 
24 For example, in its 2000 Lankhorst-Hohorst decision, the Court ruled that, as a result of the EC Treaty, thin capitalization rules cannot impose
unequal treatment between resident and nonresident EU companies, leading many EU countries to redesign those rules. In contrast, the one
Canadian decision in this area held that such discrimination may be permissible under the Canada-US tax treaty – see Specialty Manufacturing
Ltd. v Canada, [1998] 1 C.T.C. 2095 (T.C.C.), aff’d [1999] 3 Ct.C. 82 (F.C.A.).| 14 Commentary 272
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(Wilkie 1994).25 This is needed, for instance, to
permit discriminatory tax treatment under
Canada’s thin capitalization rules, which might be
another reason to consider reforming such rules to
target inbound and outbound financing as a way
to inhibit double-dip financing. The OECD is
currently reviewing possible changes to the nondis-
crimination provision in Article XXIV of the
OECD model tax treaty under the rationale that
expanding national treatment could promote more
efficient capital flows among its member countries
(see OECD 2007), a reform effort that serves to
highlight the problematic nature of the Canadian
treaty approach. 
Canada’s tax laws also include other provisions
that discriminate in favour of “Canadian corpo-
rations” – generally, corporations that have been
incorporated in Canada. For example, such corpo-
rations are eligible for tax-deferred rollovers or
amalgamations, while foreign corporations often
cannot take advantage of this preferential
treatment (see Avery Jones et al. 1991, 372-73).
Moreover, certain payments, such as those for
crossborder services, are subject to a 15 percent
withholding tax when paid to nonresident corpo-
rations (and other nonresident persons), while the
same payments to a Canadian corporation do not
attract the withholding tax, which might create a
tax disincentive for nonresident service providers
to operate in Canada to the extent that they
cannot obtain a waiver or foreign tax credit for the
withholding tax.26
While the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) does not generally govern
crossborder income tax issues, deferring instead
under Article 2103(2) to the rights and obligations
granted through bilateral tax treaties, tax protec-
tionism is particularly ill-suited to a closely
integrated free trade area. As the economies of the
two countries become more entwined, the cost of
maintaining this discriminatory treatment appears
to be escalating. At a minimum, the federal gov-
ernment should scrutinize this treatment and take
steps to reform areas where it is causing undue 
distortions in crossborder investment. 
Eliminate the Withholding Tax on
Parent/Subsidiary Dividends
In recent years, a number of governments have
become convinced that there are compelling policy
reasons to eliminate withholding taxes on
dividends paid by subsidiary corporations to their
parent corporations – so-called parent/subsidiary
dividends or direct dividends. In 1990, the EU
member states passed a directive to eliminate with-
holding taxes on parent/subsidiary dividends. In
2001, the United States and the UK agreed to
eliminate withholding taxes on parent/subsidiary
dividends set out in their tax treaty, as did the
United States and Mexico in 2004. Other
countries, including Australia, have similarly been
trying to eliminate withholding taxes on direct
dividends in their tax treaty networks. 
As noted earlier, a withholding tax can act as a
significant barrier to crossborder investment by
increasing compliance costs and contributing, in
certain cases, to international double taxation.
According to one view, parent/subsidiary dividend
withholding leads to unacceptable distortions of
investment decisionmaking and, for this reason
alone, should be abolished (Easson 1991, 17). The
combination of the withholding tax on direct
dividends and the interaction of the imputation
system in Canada and the classical system in the
United States, in fact, might be the leading tax
factor in discouraging and distorting crossborder
investment decisionmaking (Steines 1994). A
25 See Article 25 of the tax treaty. The treaty provision also prohibits discrimination against individuals on the basis of nationality or citizenship,
but Canada, unlike the United States, does not use nationality or citizenship as the basis for taxation, focusing instead on residency. Article
25(8) of the tax treaty provides, however, that Canada can continue to offer discriminatory treatment only for tax laws relating to the
deduction of interest that were in force on the date the treaty’s signing as well as subsequent modifications; this exception effectively permits
discriminatory treatment by Canada’s thin capitalization rules that were in place prior to the treaty’s signing.
26 See Regulation 105 of the Income Tax Act. The withholding tax on services traditionally has been justified on the basis that it can be difficult to
collect taxes on services income from nonresidents. Under the Fifth Protocol to the Canada-US tax treaty, a US service provider who is deemed
to operate through a permanent establishment in Canada would not be subject to the withholding tax.Commentary 272 | 15
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withholding tax on direct dividends with other
nations might have been appropriate when Canada
was a “small, capital-importing country” (Brean
1984, 158), but it is no longer appropriate given
Canada’s current status as a larger, net-capital-
exporting country. The end result is that Canadian
companies might increasingly be at a tax disad-
vantage relative to companies in countries that
have eliminated the tax. Moreover, the main-
tenance of such a tax is, like other areas of
discriminatory tax treatment, incompatible with
attempts to tie together the economic interests of
Canada and the United States in a highly
integrated free trade area. 
Despite compelling policy reasons to abolish the
tax, however, the federal government, during the
negotiations leading up to the Fifth Protocol,
refused to offer this concession to the United
States, in large part because of the revenues at
stake: as a net capital importer from the United
States, Canada stands to lose almost $1 billion (see
Canada 2008, 39) if it abolished the tax, which is
currently set at a rate of 5 percent for direct
dividends. Because Canada, as a net capital
importer from the United States, insists on
keeping the tax, the federal government naturally
would find it difficult to request that such a tax be
reduced or eliminated by countries that are net
capital importers from Canada. Thus, abolishing
the tax in the Canada-US treaty would place
Canada in a better position to negotiate similar
reforms in other tax treaties, which should
encourage further inward investment into Canada
and potentially result in additional tax revenue
from the taxation of this increased investment. 
Amend Group Taxation Laws and Encourage
Crossborder Tax Relief
As outlined previously, a major barrier to
crossborder investment is that multinational firms
operating in both Canada and the United States
generally are unable to enjoy crossborder loss con-
solidation even though they are trying to benefit
from synergies. The denial of loss deductions thus
discourages crossborder entrepreneurial activity
and risk taking, as governments fully tax any
profits when a business succeeds, but deny loss
deductions when a business fails. The European
Commission has identified group taxation and
crossborder tax relief as a major area for policy
reform to promote efficient capital flows within
the EU, and such reform has been encouraged by
European Court of Justice decisions that maintain
that the different treatment of losses between
European countries violates the freedom of estab-
lishment guaranteed by the EC Treaty (European
Commission 2001).
Before Canada can negotiate similar steps,
however, the federal government likely would have
to amend its group taxation laws. Currently,
Canadian tax laws do not permit the filing of con-
solidated tax returns for groups of related
companies. As a general rule, losses incurred by
one corporation within a corporate group cannot
be offset against the profits of corporations within
the same group (with an exception in the case of
certain corporate reorganizations, such as the liq-
uidation of a subsidiary into a parent corporation).
As a result, for certain corporations, these losses
may be forever “trapped” within the corporation. 
The United States, in contrast, permits the filing
of consolidated tax returns (when ownership
equals or exceed 80 percent of common shares),
allowing the offsetting of full losses. About two-
thirds of OECD countries similarly permit loss
offsetting within corporate groups (Donnelly and
Young 2002). In addition, US tax law permits tax-
planning structures that facilitate loss-offsetting
strategies among different parts of a business:
under the now well-established entity classification
rules, a US “C” corporation can operate as a parent
company, with dozens of single member LLCs
underneath it, and retain all of the corporate law
protection benefits while remaining a single
taxpayer to the IRS, and without engaging the
complexities of the consolidated rules.
While it is true that Canadians can also engage
in tax planning to promote loss offsetting, these
activities take up resources. For example, corpo-
rations in a loss position sometimes lend money to
a related party that is profitable. The related party
can then invest in preferred shares of the company
in the loss position, reducing its own taxable| 16 Commentary 272
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profits by deducting interest expenses on the loan.
The CRA has taken the administrative position
that such strategies between non-arm’s-length
parties are permissible (Canada 2004a). In
addition to taking up unnecessary tax planning
resources, loss offsetting via these strategies is
available only in limited cases.
Problems with Canada’s group taxation rules
have prompted proposals to revamp the system
since at least the 1960s and the report of the Royal
Commission on Taxation (Canada 1966). More
recently, the Technical Committee on Business
Taxation recommended a formal system for trans-
ferring losses between members of the same
corporate group (Canada 1997, 4.18). A barrier to
reform, however, is that, since most provincial
corporate income tax systems follow the federal
system, the reduction of profits in some provinces
might lead corporations to engage in loss-offsetting
strategies to reduce their income subject to tax
and, hence, to a fall in tax revenues in those
provinces.
Nevertheless, reform in this area is important if
Canada is to maintain its international tax compet-
itiveness. Donnelly and Young (2002) argue that
allowing intragroup transfers of corporate losses
would do far more to enhance Canada’s tax com-
petitiveness than could be accomplished by further
corporate income tax rate reductions. The federal
government should, in consultation with the
provinces, consider formalizing laws to enable loss
offsetting by Canadian business entities with an
eye to expanding crossborder group loss offsetting
down the road.
Enhance Administrative Cooperation to Reduce
Compliance Costs
Canada should also implement measures to reduce
administrative and compliance costs for
crossborder investment, including exempting
taxpayers in both Canada and the United States
from having to comply with some of the more
onerous international tax rules – such as the con-
trolled foreign corporation rules in place in both
countries – that are designed to counter tax
avoidance and tax evasion. Another important step
would be to streamline the documentation
requirements for transfer-pricing purposes for
North American firms; one set of documents,
encouraged by the PATA reforms noted earlier,
should suffice to offer evidence to the tax
authorities that reasonable efforts have been made
to determine the appropriate transfer prices.
Commentators have also identified a number of
problem areas surrounding mergers and reorgani-
zations arising from the two countries’ different tax
rules (see, for example, Brown and Manolakas
1997). At times, these different rules impose
income taxes on accrued gains on different types of
crossborder corporate formations, reorganizations,
and liquidations even while, within each country,
the same activities are normally conducted on a
tax-free or tax-deferred basis. The existing tax
treaty provides only limited relief in this area, as
capital gains taxes on crossborder restructuring
operations remain prohibitively high, forcing
Canadian and US firms to maintain their existing
inefficient structures.27 Since further North
American economic integration likely would be
accompanied by additional consolidation of
corporate activity, the NAFTA countries should
take steps to address this issue.
Another idea would be to form a trilateral gov-
ernment institution, perhaps constituted by the
Canadian, US, and Mexican tax authorities, to
grant case-by-case approval of tax-free or tax-
deferred North American mergers and acquisitions
(McIntyre 1994). Such an organization could
scrutinize deals and grant tax relief if it felt that the
merger would not result in tax avoidance. This
proposal is consistent with a change under the
Fifth Protocol to the Canada-US tax treaty that
proposes to enhance crossborder audit cooperation
by, among other things, permitting tax authorities
from Canada or the United States to conduct joint
audits and investigate and depose witnesses in each
other’s country. Such enhanced cooperation would
27 Article XIII(8) of the Canada-US tax treaty provides that tax authorities “may agree” to try to provide relief for double taxation or overtaxation
of crossborder combinations, but the provision does not mandate such relief nor does it set out a process to expedite the grant of relief, if any.Commentary 272 | 17
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facilitate crossborder tax planning while protecting
against activities that violate Canadian and/or US
tax laws or that would result in an unacceptable
reduction in tax revenues in one or both countries.
These recommendations are also consistent with
global international tax trends, which emphasize
administrative cooperation between tax authorities
to smooth over problems exacerbated by the
interaction of different national income tax
regimes (Cockfield 2006). By focusing on adminis-
trative cooperation, governments will feel less of a
need to harmonize their tax laws and policies with
those of other countries, which follows their desire
to preserve sovereign control over their tax systems
to the greatest extent possible. 
Conclusion
Amid the recent storm of activity surrounding
Canadian-US tax developments, a number of
changes to the Canada-US tax treaty strive to
reduce tax as a barrier to crossborder investment,
and could represent an encouraging signal of
readiness to tackle other problems. The willingness
to tackle double-dip and other tax-efficient
financing structures follows sound policy goals,
but at this point it remains an open question
whether other reform efforts, such as reforming the
thin capitalization rules, might be better suited to
restricting abusive interest expense deductions for
international financings. 
There remain a number of other problem areas
that unduly restrict or distort crossborder
investment, ultimately with the potential to harm
Canada’s economic interests. A reform package
could include: reviewing and targeting for elim-
ination tax rules that unduly discriminate against
the interests of US investors; eliminating with-
holding taxes on crossborder parent/subsidiary
dividends; changing domestic group taxation laws,
with the ultimate goal of crossborder tax loss relief;
and enhancing administrative cooperation between
the two countries’ tax authorities to reduce com-
pliance costs for firms with operations in both
countries, including the development of a case-by-
case approval process for tax relief for crossborder
mergers and acquisitions.
Tax barriers to crossborder capital flows are
increasingly unsuitable in a highly integrated free
trade area that strives to promote the economic
interests of individuals in Canada and the United
States through heightened trade and investment
ties. The federal government should promote the
creation of more silver linings in the storm by
taking action to reduce still further tax barriers that
all too frequently dampen crossborder investment
activity.| 18 Commentary 272
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